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In recent decades universities around the world have become the focus of intense political 
interest as drivers of global and national economies. The mission of the modern university 
was historically defi ned as social and cultural as well as economic. The balance of priorities 
has been undergoing a major shift, however, as higher education is increasingly being 
recognised as a driver of the new ‘knowledge economy’.2 In an environment in which higher 
education is treated as an aspect of economic policy, universities are coming under increasing 
pressure from governments and transnational institutions to become more entrepreneurial 
and responsive to the market.3
This new order of academic work has been described as ‘academic capitalism’,4 and its 
demands often clash with the traditional structures and values of the university. Researchers 
and policy-makers are only beginning to understand how the clash of old and new in the 
academic workplace affects corruption risks. While evidence of corruption is diffi cult to 
collect, much is known about the structural factors that tend to increase its likelihood. Five 
key structural changes in twenty-fi rst-century academia, outlined below, are known in social 
science research to be linked with dishonest and corrupt behaviour. These emerging 
corruption risks require further empirical study to understand how the changing structure of 
universities might affect the ethical behaviour of academics and university administrators.
Emerging corruption risks in universities
In all social realms, but particularly in science and higher education, ethical behaviour is 
regulated by collective norms. When these communal norms of behaviour are eroded, 
individuals’ internal incentive mechanisms no longer reward good behaviour, and the risks of 
unethical behaviour rise.5 Even principled individuals may justify a breach of their own values 
when they see hostile or dishonest actions as widespread, claiming that they simply cannot 
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afford to be honest.6 In academia, the new pressures experienced by faculty are often contrary 
to the traditional values of the academic profession. The resulting ambiguity can easily lead to 
disillusionment and give licence to unethical behaviour.7
Excessive competition
In recent years, competition in academia has been on the rise.8 It is often assumed to play a 
positive role in stimulating excellence. Competition can be a double-edged sword, however. 
Numerous studies have shown that a competitive working climate increases the likelihood 
of unethical conduct.9 Competition for resources creates a kind of workplace that values 
individual achievement over collaborative work. When such a climate is present in academia, 
the pressure to perform sometimes drives faculty to cross the line into abusing their authority 
for private gain.
The emerging model of academic work as a profi t-oriented activity has increased levels of 
competition among faculty in higher education.10 Academic scientists in particular perceive 
their fi elds as increasingly competitive, and often attribute bad behaviour to the associated 
pressures.11
Competition can affect academics’ perceptions of what is and is not ethical. In one study, 
for instance, junior researchers in different disciplines were asked to rate real-life scenarios 
with ethical implications. Those in the health sciences performed signifi cantly worse than 
those in less competitive fi elds.12 Another study of academics at the 100 most research-
intensive universities in the United States found that self-reported unethical behaviour in the 
life sciences was more frequent in high-competition fi elds.13 These fi ndings confi rm that 
pressure to perform affects the likelihood of faculty engaging in unethical behaviour as a way 
of protecting their competitive edge. In light of these fi ndings, university administrators and 
professional associations must not assume that all competition produces desirable results 
when striving to stimulate the competitiveness of researchers.
Misalignment of teaching and research
In the last two decades research has gained precedence over teaching in many academic 
working environments.14 In many cases, however, faculty do not have the space both to 
generate new knowledge and to dedicate time to teaching, and they often cannot realistically 
meet all expectations.15 Confl icting demands increase the likelihood that hard-pressed 
individuals might abuse their authority to escape a double bind of having to fail some 
expectations in order to satisfy others.
For example, during the implementation of the Bologna Process16 in Ukraine, faculty were 
told to increase their research output without any simultaneous change to their heavy 
instructional workloads or salaries. Some admitted that they responded to the confl icting 
demands by producing bogus or worthless research.17 Other reports suggest that many 
others resort to corruption, such as demanding bribes from students, or offering unnecessary 
but lucrative private tutoring.18
Although research has always been an essential component of faculty work, its importance 
has shifted in signifi cant ways in the last few decades. The emergence of international 
rankings and the idea of a research-intensive ‘world-class university’ elevated research 
productivity to top priority,19 and the work of academic staff is being reshaped by an 
unprecedented emphasis on performance evaluation.20 Pressure for more research of higher 
quality becomes a fertile ground for corruption, however, if it is not accompanied by a 
concurrent adjustment of the working arrangements for academic staff. As European and 
African institutions historically tasked with student instruction now experience greater pressure 
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from governments to produce more research, demands on faculty must be adjusted to refl ect 
current priorities. Ironically, more research is needed on how pressure for research is reshaping 
the daily work of faculty, especially those in developing countries, and to what extent it creates 
tensions between ethical values and the realities of professional survival.
Disproportionate rewards
With research as the top priority for many academic institutions, the stakes of publishing in 
high-impact journals for individual researchers run higher than ever. Evidence indicates that 
the disproportionate rewards of such publications may create incentives for dishonesty. For 
instance, journals with higher impact factors have been found to have signifi cantly higher 
rates of retraction for the specifi c reason of fraud.21 Researchers point to the high rewards 
associated with publishing in high-impact journals as drivers of such misconduct.22
Disproportionate rewards for high-impact publication result from a wider trend in higher 
education towards external rewards for performance. Recognising the critical role of higher 
education in national development, governments and funding agencies reward academics 
and institutions that deliver measurable results. Extrinsic rewards are known to have the 
potential to diminish intrinsic motivation, however,23 which is in turn associated with greater 
levels of prosocial attitudes.24 An unbalanced use of rewards based on external performance 
may undermine the motivational forces that drive academics to serve the public good rather 
than private interest. For example, academics at some public institutions in Ukraine are 
required to submit proof of having published a number of articles each year in order to 
have their annual contract extended. This practice encourages short-term projects and can 
cause some academic researchers to produce low-quality research with little benefi t to 
society.25
In recent decades the rewards of dishonesty in academic research have been made 
greater by the rapid growth of the higher education sector and an oversupply of academics 
competing for limited resources. In many fi elds, only a small number of doctoral graduates are 
able to gain secure academic positions and conduct independent research. The pyramid 
rules of contemporary science resemble those of a tournament – ‘amplifying small differences 
in productivity into large differences in recognition and reward’.26 Such disproportionate 
and perverse incentives have been linked to practices that include interference in the peer 
review process, sabotaging the work of colleagues and engaging in questionable research 
conduct.27
Given the ethical risks associated with disproportionate reliance on extrinsic motivations, 
policy-makers and research administrators should recognise and cultivate intrinsic as well 
as extrinsic motivations for academic faculty. A balanced approach would capitalise on 
the proven productivity rewards of intrinsic motivation28 and avoid the hypocritical trap of 
demanding integrity while rewarding outcomes at all cost.
Injustice in working environments
Ethical conduct is also known to be associated with perceptions of procedural justice: 
fairness in the processes for deciding who gets what resources. When people perceive 
these processes as unfair, they are more likely to compensate by engaging in unethical 
behaviours.29
In the United States, perceptions of unfairness in the academic workplace have risen in 
recent decades with the growing reliance on adjunct and non-tenure-track appointments. 
Faculty on fi xed-term contracts face signifi cant pay inequities, little if any job security and 
fewer advancement opportunities than their tenure-track colleagues.30 They make from 
197 GLOBALISATION AND ACADEMIC CORRUPTION 
22 per cent to 40 per cent less than tenure-track staff,31 and are often seen as a second-class 
teaching force. Reports suggest that they can lose their jobs for reasons such as sexual 
orientation,32 unpopular political opinions33 or by irritating students.34
Unfair treatment of those in a vulnerable employment position creates a fertile ground for 
abuses of authority, especially when adjunct faculty do not receive suffi cient mentoring. The 
incidence of corruption across different academic ranks has not yet been the subject of 
suffi cient empirical study, but it is known that responses to perceived injustice are mediated 
by social identity, or the standing of individuals in their social environment. Unfair treatment is 
more likely to prompt unethical behaviour in those who do not feel secure in their position and 
have reason to fear that it may be undermined, as is known to be the case with adjunct 
faculty.35 The limited research that is currently available should also prompt administrators 
and policy-makers to have serious cause for concern. Studies conducted by University of 
Minnesota professor Melissa Anderson and colleagues confi rm that perceptions of injustice 
are positively correlated with self-reported misbehaviour in academia. Their study of biomedical 
faculty, for instance, found that perceptions of unfairness are more strongly linked to 
misbehaviour for less well-established researchers36 – those whose position in the academic 
workplace is more vulnerable.
Government and university administrators concerned with preventing misbehaviour in 
academia should invest in the fair remuneration and mentoring of part-time faculty. Such 
investment begins with the recognition of their signifi cant and permanent role. Adjunct 
appointments in the United States rose from 22 per cent of the workforce in 197037 to 47 per 
cent in 2010.38 When almost three-quarters of undergraduate instructors are now employed 
in limited-term contracts, their training and mentoring are crucial for maintaining not only the 
integrity of the academic profession but also the quality of university education.
Concentration of power with insuffi cient checks and balances
In the past two decades there has been a rapid transition in the distribution of power in higher 
education systems around the globe. It has led to concentrations of authority that resist 
constructive checks and balances, creating opportunities for corruption.
As universities are subjected to increasing pressure to fuel the growth of the ‘knowledge 
economy’, traditions of shared faculty governance are being challenged in response to 
demands for increased effi ciency and responsiveness to the market.39 For example, many 
European countries, such as Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, have seen 
a concentration of executive power in the hands of a managerial team at the expense of 
traditional faculty bodies. Multiple reforms in the past two decades, both in Europe and in the 
United States, were based on the assumption that universities can better serve the needs of 
the economy if more competencies are placed in the hands of administrators.40 The shift 
raised concerns about the excessive power of administrators and the marginalisation of 
faculty.41
A recent rash of embezzlement cases involving senior administrators in the United States 
has exposed the possibility that some of the new arrangements place insuffi cient checks and 
balances on powerful university executives.42 For example, the former president of Kansas 
City University of Medicine and Biosciences was recently indicted in a large embezzlement 
case. Over a period of many years she had produced fake minutes from committee meetings 
at which the only item of business was to award her payments of US$65,000. The lack of 
checks and balances on the president cost the university US$1.5 million in unauthorised 
compensation and fraudulent reimbursements.43
In other countries, such as Poland and the Czech Republic, the trend to concent-
rate power in the hands of managers achieved the opposite effect to what happened in 
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Denmark and the Netherlands. 
European pressures for more admin-
istrative power provoked strong resi-
stance that entrenched the power of 
faculty bodies and stalled institu-
tional accountability.44 In Poland, for 
instance, faculty impeded reforms to 
an existing governance structure in 
which the university senate com-
bines legislative, administrative and 
supervisory competencies.45 Reform 
did not proceed despite general 
agreement that combining the func-
tions of employee representation 
and management is a recipe for the 
abuse of authority for the benefi t 
of individuals and narrow interest 
groups.
Whether power lies in the 
hands of administrators or faculty, 
its excessive concentration without 
suffi cient accountability carries 
increased risks of corruption. These 
may take the form of embezzlement, the improper allocation of funds, failure to follow due 
process, and others.46 These risks must be mediated with a separation of the legislative, 
executive and supervisory functions in the governance of universities. While diffi cult politically, 
a strategic separation of powers is likely to boost not only the integrity of the academic 
workplace but also its own well-being and productivity.
Conclusion
Funding and governance policies that follow the model of a market-responsive university are 
reshaping the daily work of the faculty and administrators charged with realising the mission 
of higher education. While generating new values, ‘academic capitalism’ also creates new 
corruption risks that need to be recognised and dealt with by academic and government 
leaders.
The good news is that, despite the new pressures, the majority of academics still 
strongly subscribe to the norms of their profession. It is troubling, however, that they 
increasingly perceive the ethic of their workplaces as being inconsistent with their own 
beliefs.47 The integrity of the academic workplace depends on a continued belief in common 
norms. If faculty see those around them engaging in counter-normative behaviour and 
profi ting without censure, the ethos that has conserved academic integrity runs the risk of 
disintegrating. Ambiguous norms around the proper exercise of authority in higher edu-
cation are bound to cast a long shadow over the professions for which students are being 
prepared. Higher education leaders in both government and academia must work to prevent 










Figure 3.6 Drivers of corruption in higher education
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